Clements Center Undergraduate Fellow Chessie Reece pens op-ed on The 2017 Catalonian Independence Referendum

Chessie Reese | Jun 25, 2018

Chessie Reece is a rising senior studying Plan II and Government.  She has been an Undergraduate Fellow for 2 years and attended the Maymester in London this summer.  Read her full article below:

 

From Stand-Off to Stupidity: The 2017 Catalonian Independence Referendum

The world was hardly holding its breath for Catalonia’s independence referendum on October 1st, 2017. Then, suddenly, mismanagement on both sides of the conflict set the stage for the largest challenge to Spanish democracy since the end of the Franco dictatorship in 1975. The issue has now produced economic and political ramifications not just for Catalonia and Spain, but for the European Union as a whole.

In the lead up to the conflict, visitors to Catalonia may not have been surprised to hear of an upcoming independence referendum. Red, yellow and blue independence flags drape hundreds of balconies in Barcelona and Catalan is almost exclusively spoken in public areas. However, the result of the vote was 92% in favor of independence, a huge and unexpected margin. Reputable opinion polls prior to the referendum showed only 41% of Catalans intending to vote in support of independence, but as less than half the population of Catalonia voted, it is clear that the pro-independence voters went to the polls in droves.

What happened to the anti-independence voting bloc? First, the central government in Madrid sent the Spanish national police to Catalonia to attempt to stop the referendum. More than 800 people were injured in the conflict that followed. Millions of potential “NO” voters were therefore scared into staying home by fear of violence against them by either the police or pro-independence protestors. Second, positive feelings towards staying in Spain are less motivational than negative feelings of cultural and political oppression. The latter is more cause to turn out and vote. Finally, anti-independence voters had historical reason to believe that the referendum would not actually lead to independence, but rather simply strengthen demands for more autonomy for the region or be an empty gesture altogether. Thus, opponents of the secessionist movement boycotted the vote as illegitimate and meaningless.

Indeed, Carles Puigdemont, the (now former) President Generalitat of Catalonia, did not immediately declare independence despite his previous promise to do so within 48 hours of the “binding” vote. He instead asked Madrid for negotiations and mediation on the subject of more autonomy for Catalonia. A standoff ensued. A week later, he hesitated to clearly declare independence in an awkward speech to the Catalonian parliament. This prompted (now former) Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy to ask for clarification of the meaning of the speech within 5 days. At the final hour, Puigdemont again demanded negotiations, pushing the issue of formally declaring independence to the Catalonian parliament as a whole. It did so on October 27th. Rajoy immediately initiated Article 155 of the Spanish constitution to take total administrative control of Catalonia, and Puigdemont and four other ministers of the newly-dissolved Catalonian government fled to Brussels ahead of international arrest warrants.

A few months later, it is worth examining the short-term and predicting the long-term consequences of the referendum for each stakeholder in the region:

The central government in Madrid: Though their initial blunder in sending the Spanish national police to Catalonia only exacerbated domestic and international tensions and strengthened the separatist voters’ resolve, former Prime Minister Rajoy and his government had the support of the European Union and the clear constitutional power to assume direct control of any of the 17 semi-autonomous regions of Spain. Puigdemont’s unilateral action on an undemocratic voter mandate won the central government more visible support within Spain and Catalonia amongst anti-independence residents. Criticism of the Catalonian government’s handling of the referendum at every turn is therefore giving Madrid a stronger hand in managing the conflict and discouraging flare-ups of separatist movements elsewhere, such as in the Basque country in the north.  

Catalans: The economy of the region in wake of the conflict is concerning. Tourism, one of the region’s main industries, decreased by 15% in the lead up the referendum. Banks and businesses relocated their headquarters outside of Catalonia in advance of any further conflict. Further, the EU would almost certainly never recognize an independent Catalonia, as unanimous approval is required for membership. Even if Catalonia legally and democratically declared independence in the future, Spain would almost certainly vote against its membership in any case. The long-term economic hit the region would take from losing EU membership — adjusting to a different currency, amending visa and travel laws, more capital flight, job loss due to emigration by anti-separatists — would take the wind out of the main pro-independence argument: Catalonia’s flourishing economy is propping up the floundering Spanish economy through unfair taxation.

The European Union: There is some political irony in the fact that Puigdemont and 4 other former Catalan ministers fled to Belgium. Though the governing body of the EU, the European Commission, has not directly intervened in the Catalonian secession issue, Brexit and its ensuing complications for the bloc have fanned fears of separatist movements elsewhere. For example, Belgium itself has seen the stirrings of a pro-independence movement in the wealthier, Dutch-speaking northern region of Flanders. Flemish dissatisfaction with the government in Brussels is for the same reason as that of Catalans with Madrid: the transfer of funds from the richest region to poorer ones without more representation or political autonomy. Though the economic consequences of the Catalan declaration are likely to discourage unilateral secessionism in Europe in and of itself, all eyes will be on if balance is struck between putting down a self-deterministic movement and recognizing a need for increased dialogue with and political concessions for dissatisfied peoples and regions.